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INTRODUCTION 
ntering into force in 1970, The 
Nonproliferation Treaty’s (NPT) mission is 
to end the creation and spread of nuclear 
weapons, as well as, promote the use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes (Treaty). Since the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the 
international community has placed regulating 
nuclear power as a top priority (Review 
Conference). With over 190 party states, five of 
which are nuclear weapons states, the NPT 
represents one of the only international efforts 
towards non-nuclear proliferation and complete 
disarmament (Treaty).   
The NPT is among the most influential 
nuclear arms treaties. In the past 47 years, the NPT 
has directed states towards addressing the issue of 
nuclear arms, leading to the dismantling of over 
50,000 nuclear weapons (Kristensen).  However, 
the way in which the NPT has shaped the 
international community and its system, remains 
contested.  Since 1970, states have either increased 
or decreased their stockpiles, while some have 
promised not to acquire weapons at all. Although 
the treaty has not changed, its influence on state’s 
decisions to arm has. This leads one to question 
whether a world free of the threat of nuclear war is 
achievable under the NPT.  
Some scholars argue that the NPT is the 
world’s only hope for avoiding nuclear war, while 
others believe the NPT has promoted a 
hierarchical system where only certain states have 
permission to explore nuclear capabilities. To 
understand why countries continue to preserve, 
develop, or refrain from using nuclear arms, this 
paper will consider the question: How has the NPT 
influenced nuclear party, non-nuclear party, and 
nuclear non-party states? Why are some states 
increasing their stockpiles, and others are not? 
Why are nuclear party states refusing to disarm 
further? Finally, this paper will consider whether 
the NPT prevents countries from pursuing nuclear 
weapons, especially when external threats incline 
them to do so. 
 
HISTORY 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for 
Peace” proposal initiated international efforts 
towards nuclear proliferation (Review 
Conference). His call to disarm and dismantle the 
nuclear technology used for weaponry, resulted in 
the formation of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). Since 1957, the IAEA has 
regulated the use of nuclear technology by the 
international community via the safeguard systems 
(Review Conference). The safeguards ensures that 
countries comply with the goals and regulations of 
the NPT by passing inspections administered by 
the agency (Treaty).  
Since the establishment of the NPT, nuclear 
weapons have declined from about 70,000 to about 
14,000 in 2017 (Kristensen). The majority of the 
disarmament is attributed to the proliferation 
agreements reached by the international 
community (Kristensen).  NPT continues to 
strengthen its provisions every five years through 
considerable review (Review Conference). 
However, not every conference means continuous 
progress. Several conferences, including those in 
1980, 1990, 1995, and 2005, were unable to reach 
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an agreement. Many states remained conflicted 
over how much progress the nuclear state parties – 
United States, United Kingdom, France, China, 
and Russia – were making towards complete 
disarmament (Review Conference). This is a 
serious concern because the treaty asks parties to 
disarm at an “early date” (Duarte 3).  
 In addition, some states have not committed 
to the global efforts toward nuclear proliferation. 
For example, countries like Israel, Pakistan, and 
India have never signed the NPT; and continue to 
possess nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon 
states such as Iraq, Libya, and Iran have also 
attempted to obtain nuclear weapons. This violates 
the regulations set forth by the treaty and the 
IAEA. Also, the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has 
since remained at the center of nuclear 
proliferation due to its testing of nuclear missiles 
(3). Furthermore, many party states find their 
ability to acquire technologies able to produce 
fissile materials to be an “inalienable right” (4). 
They believe that the safeguards constrain their 
ability for peaceful nuclear activities. In addition, 
these states find that the constraints are enforced 
disproportionately between the non-nuclear state 
parties and the nuclear-weapon states (4).  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over the course of the NPT’s existence, various 
schools of thought have both analyzed and 
interpreted the function of the treaty on the 
international community, and its system as a 
whole. Exploring the perspectives and 
methodologies of realists, liberals, and 
constructivists theories on the NPT have led to 
various conclusions. Realists argue that the NPT 
functions as a tool by dominant states such as the 
United States and Russia to preserve their control 
over nuclear weaponry, while simultaneously 
restricting the ability of other states to this same 
control (Petersen 24).  Liberals view the NPT as a 
tool to protect the world from the potential 
destruction nuclear weapons can cause. They also 
view the treaty as a means of reshaping the way 
leaders view state security and nuclear weaponry 
(26). While Constructivists perceive the NPT as a 
social construct that establishes order within the 
international community (43).  
The realist argument that the NPT is a means 
for superpowers to exercise their control stems 
from fundamental realist beliefs. A core premise in 
realist and classical realist theory is that states are 
rational actors looking to maximize their self-
interest, which includes maintaining national 
security (Nel 27). The history of nuclear weapons, 
specifically, has brought about the “security 
dilemma.” The “security dilemma” causes 
insecurity among states in the international 
community (Ikenberry 14). As a state begins to 
equip itself with nuclear weaponry, other states 
feel insecure and begin to acquire their own 
nuclear arms. Evident between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, this ultimately leads to 
proliferation (14). States like the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom realized 
that the spread of nuclear weapons could destroy 
the control these superpowers have over their 
allies (Tertrais 1). Therefore, international treaties, 
like the NPT, are created by the will of these 
superpowers, since dismantling nuclear arsenals 
would not reflect the rational thinking states 
possess (Carranza 493 and Allison 12). Therefore, 
the NPT was, and is, intended for these powers to 
maintain control over their weapons and prevent 
others from acquiring their own (12).  
Scholars have concluded that nations, 
especially great powers, obtain nuclear weapons 
for multiple reasons. One of which involves 
nations emulating the weaponry of other nations 
as a way to oppose them (Waltz). Another reason 
is that nations will build their own arsenals out of 
fear that their stronger allies will not protect them 
if they face nuclear threats from enemies. This was 
the reality in Great Britain when they feared the 
United States would not protect them from the 
Soviet Union’s threats. Another reason a nation 
will acquire nuclear weapons is if their adversaries 
also acquire weapons, or out of fear of their future 
capabilities. Also, countries find that nuclear 
weapons are a cheaper alternative than 
conventional arms and can solidify their 
international standing (Waltz).   
 In addition, realist scholar, such as Kenneth 
Waltz, even argue that a world where nuclear arms 
are available to all will lead to a peaceful world. 
Waltz reaches this conclusion by asserting that 
states discourage one another from using nuclear 
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weapons out of fear of the devastation it will cause 
(Waltz). Therefore, if all states have nuclear 
capabilities, and deterrence strategies fail, then 
these countries will avoid going to war out of fear 
of a nuclear catastrophe (Waltz). This is was 
evident during the Cold War, when both the 
United States and the Soviet Union realized that 
going to war meant immeasurable losses on both 
sides. Knowledge of nuclear weapons along with 
fear enabled both parties to come to a resolution 
(Allison 136).  
Liberal perspectives on the NPT center around 
the core belief that a state’s best interest is to 
pursue the common good (Petersen 131). Liberals 
argue that the NPT is reducing the proliferation of 
nuclear weaponry. In addition, by following the 
NPT, states are able to focus on their national 
security (131). Since Carr and other liberals believe 
that the international community has a moral 
obligation to one another, treaties are an effective 
form of governance because of the element of 
cooperation it requires from all states (147). Evans 
and Kawaguchi demonstrate this claim by citing 
the 189 member states and South Africa’s 
dismantling of their nuclear weapons (78). Since 
member states acknowledge “…nuclear weapons 
are simply wrong”, the moral aspect of NPT 
should not be underestimated (78). Liberals view 
the NPT as a rational way for states to ensure their 
security by eliminating nuclear weapons.  
In addition, liberals argue that economic costs 
stopped the United States and the Soviet Union 
from going to war. Liberals note that the amount 
of money spent on creating nuclear weapons, as 
well as, funding delivery vehicles and other 
transportation systems is in the billions (128). 
Therefore, going to nuclear war is not a rational 
decision because of the economic costs invested in 
creating and maintaining the weapons. 
Furthermore, liberals reference Germany, Japan, 
Belarus, South Africa, Ukraine, and other states 
that have removed their nuclear weapons or 
passed on the opportunity to create nuclear 
weapons. These states show that having this 
weaponry is not necessary for national security, 
nor is it a requirement for rational states, or those 
working in their self-interest (129).  
Constructivist perspective on the NPT focuses 
on the way in which the treaty has formed as a 
means for international governance (158). 
Constructivism analyzes how ideas and beliefs 
shape the way in which states behave, and how 
other states react to that behavior (158). Through 
documents like the NPT, the international 
community is able to create new norms and 
standards for itself by reestablishing the 
community’s behavior. This occurs when leaders 
come together to make decisions and ultimately 
define what is and is not acceptable (159). For the 
NPT, this occurs every five years at conferences 
that discuss the direction of nuclear arms in the 
international community. There, new provisions 
are drawn, issues are discussed, and resolutions are 
made, ultimately, reshaping what the NPT means 
to both the international community as a whole, 
and the individual member states. 
 An example of this constructivist concept is 
with Egypt’s admission into the NPT. When it 
came to nuclear weaponry, Egypt was originally 
interested in acquiring its own nuclear technology. 
This interest formed from the threat Egypt faced 
from Israel’s nuclear activity (Bakanic 18). Egypt 
attempted to move forward with nuclear 
programs, as well as, appeal to India and the Soviet 
Union for assistance; however, these attempts were 
unsuccessful. In 1981, Egypt joined the NPT 
(Gregory 22). Egyptian leaders agreed that joining 
the NPT would mean greater benefits than the 
status associated with having nuclear weapons 
(Rublee 147). This is evident from the strong US-
Egypt relations, and the contribution of over $2 
billion in aid provided per year (Petersen 161). In 
addition, Egypt is able to criticize Israel’s vague 
nuclear activity and be a leader in the region. This 
shift in Egypt’s ideas and beliefs, from seeking 
security and stature via the attempt to acquire 
nuclear weaponry, to joining the NPT and 
combating Israel, shows how the NPT is able to 
alter state’s identity, interests, and behaviors (162).  
The stark contrast between each school of 
thought illustrates the dividing perspectives on the 
NPT’s ability to achieve non-proliferation and 
complete disarmament. By analyzing the 
methodology, it is evident that the realist approach 
relies on the initial formation of the treaty and the 
power structure among states, while the liberalist 
approach requires a look at today’s involvement 
among member states. The constructivist 
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perspective has a more fluid interpretation of the 
purpose and function of the NPT, which alters as 
leaders come together – via international 
conferences – to discuss it.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
Regardless of how each school of thought analyzes 
the NPT, valid arguments are present on each side. 
These arguments give way to a better 
understanding of the successes and shortfalls of 
the treaty. Understanding the influence of the NPT 
on the international community requires an 
analysis of nuclear party, non-nuclear party, and 
nuclear non-party weapon states. This paper will 
examine nuclear party states such as the United 
States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and 
China, and how the NPT has influenced their 
decisions to decrease their nuclear stockpiles. It 
will also explore how these states maintain their 
remaining weapons and the affect this has on the 
international community. The following research 
will also analyze whether the NPT is a reason for 
why non-Nuclear weapon states like Japan and 
Brazil, choose not to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Lastly, this paper will expand upon the NPT’s 
relationship with nuclear non-party states like 
Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Within 
this point, further analysis will determine whether 
the NPT can discourage, or even prevent, 
countries facing external threats from acquiring 
nuclear weapons. 
 
CASE STUDIES: NUCLEAR - WEAPON 
STATE PARTIES  
The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state party as a 
state that has “manufactured and exploded a 
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device 
prior to January 1, 1967” (Treaty 1968). These 
countries include the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, China, and Russia (Review 
Conference). 
The treaty states that signers of the document 
believe there are benefits to the peaceful nuclear 
technology that states create, which include the 
byproducts that come with nuclear explosive 
devices. Therefore, nuclear technology should be 
available to all states regardless of whether they are 
a nuclear or non-nuclear weapon state party 
(Treaty 1968). The NPT requires a number of non-
proliferation efforts for nuclear-weapon states. 
The treaty prohibits nuclear-weapon state parties 
from transferring nuclear weapons and devices, as 
well as, control of such items to non-nuclear states. 
Article I also prohibits states from encouraging or 
assisting non-nuclear weapon states in engineering 
such weapons. Article VI of the treaty asks that 
each party pursue negotiations, and create an 
efficient means to reach nuclear disarmament at 
“an early date,” as well as, a treaty on complete 
disarmament under international control. In 
addition, the NPT requires the votes of all nuclear-
weapon state parties in order for an amendment to 
be approved (Treaty 1968).  
Of the 14,930 nuclear warheads remaining, 
about 9,400 are in military stockpiles (Kristensen). 
More than 3,900 are deployed with operational 
forces belonging to British, and French forces, 
however, about 93% of these weapons belong to 
Russia and the United States. About 1,800 are 
ready to launch at a moment’s notice. Although 
the number of nuclear weapons has decreased 
tremendously since the 1986, (about 55,400 
weapons reduction) many argue that the rate at 
which these countries are disarming has slowed in 
the last 25 years. In addition, all of the nuclear 
weapon states appear to be retaining their 
remaining stockpiles, and undergoing 
modernization programs to revolutionize them 
(Kristensen).  
The United States, United Kingdom, Russia, 
France, and China began creating nuclear weapons 
during the Cold War. The United States did so as 
an inexpensive and proactive approach to Russian 
aggression during that time. Not only did the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki end WWII, 
but it also sent a message to Russia of the United 
States capabilities. This sparked Russia’s urgency 
to produce their own nuclear weapons, initiating 
what scholars call the nuclear arms race. Britain, 
France, and China went on to develop their own 
nuclear weapons programs as well, refusing to rely 
on the U.S. and Russia for security from a nuclear 
threat.  
By 1986, the world held about 70,300 nuclear 
weapons (Kristensen). The creation of the NPT led 
to major disarmament among these nations, with a 
total reduction of about 55,000 nuclear weapons 
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(Kristensen). A majority of this reduction 
occurred during the 1990’s when fear of nuclear 
war was a major concern (Kristensen). Today’s 
reduction rate has slowed significantly with many 
leaders refusing to dismantle their nuclear 
stockpiles completely. In a 2015 U.S. State 
Department report, the U.S. found that Russia 
violated The U.S.’s Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty (INF) claiming that they tested a 
ground-launched cruise missile (Reif). According 
to a NATO report, Russia has also performed 
simulated nuclear attacks on NATO allies and 
partners, such as Sweden, in March of 2013 (Nato 
15). In addition, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin 
expressed his perspective on nuclear arms. In 
2000, he adopted a military doctrine that allowed 
Russia to use nuclear weapons against those who 
present “large-scale aggression utilizing 
conventional weapons in situations critical to the 
national security of the Russian federation” 
(Russia’s Military).  This is a dramatic change in 
Russia’s former policy, which had forbade Russia 
from being the first to use nuclear weapons 
(Russia’s Military).  
President Putin is not the only leader who has 
presented such controversial policies. In 1978, the 
U.K. policy assured the international community 
the country would not use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear state parties, 
unless an attack was committed against the U.K., 
its territories, military, or allies, by a non-nuclear 
state party with assistance by a nuclear-weapon 
state (Kristensen 2011 93). Then in 1995, the U.K. 
broadened this policy to include any invasion or 
attack on any state that the U.K. possessed a 
security commitment with (93). The country’s 
Strategic Defense and Security Review in 2010 
stated that although the UK faces no threat from 
nuclear-states, they could still refer to this policy if 
a future threat of attack occurred, leaving room for 
potential conflict among the U.K. and non-nuclear 
state parties (94).  
 Policies toward maintaining and using nuclear 
weapons are only half the issue. These nuclear 
weapon states are also working towards 
modernizing their remaining stockpiles as well. In 
2010, the U.K. released the number of warheads in 
its arsenal to the public by, announcing plans to 
shrink its stockpile from 160 to 120 (90). As of 
2017, the U.K. still has roughly 215 weapons 
(Kristensen). This number encompasses weapons 
in military stockpiles, those that are retired, and 
those that ‘will be’ dismantled. The U.K.’s 
stockpile can arguably be considered the smallest 
of the five states (Kristensen 2011 91). However, 
the U.K. has also admitted to preserving some of 
its nuclear weaponry. In its Strategic Defense and 
Security Review (SDSR), the U.K. explained that it 
remains focused on renewing its nuclear deterrent 
force to protect itself from the current “age of 
uncertainty” (Securing Britain). Although the UK 
has renounced its biological and chemical weapons 
programs from the Cold War, the country still has 
a highly developed missile program that continues 
to develop (United Kingdom).  
The U.K. has also joined forces with France, in 
terms of security and defense (Kristensen 2011 93). 
Through bilateral treaties, these countries are 
working to maintain and develop their respective 
nuclear arsenals (93). The French government is 
not, as of yet, planning a future reduction of their 
nuclear weapons (Kristensen, 2015 30). The 
country spends approximately 3.6-4.6 billion U.S. 
dollars annually on nuclear forces (Acheson). The 
French President Francois Hollande announced 
that 12.3% of that budget would specifically fund 
nuclear weapon modernization (France Nuclear). 
This includes modernizing submarines, aircrafts, 
warheads, and nuclear facilities (Kristensen 2015 
30). Hollande plans to continue this funding until 
2019 (France Nuclear). In addition, France is also 
looking into the study of next generation 
weaponry (Kristensen 2015 30). The country’s 
interest in maintaining their current nuclear 
weapons arsenal, while simultaneously 
modernizing such technology, dramatically 
contrasts with the obligations imposed by the NPT 
to dismantle nuclear weaponry.  
What began in 1970 as a major motivator for 
these superpowers to disarm is now forgotten. 
After decades of disarmament, the superpowers 
are now slowing their reduction, and 
simultaneously modernizing their stockpiles. The 
reason for this is twofold. First, relations today 
between countries are similar to that of the Cold 
War. Today, U.S.-Russia relations have reached 
serious lows comparable to that of the 1940s. This 
is a result of U.S.-Russia aggressions towards each 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS · VOLUME XIX · 2018 
41 
 
other from nuclear weapons disputes, the Syria 
crisis, U.S. allegations of Russian election hacking 
and more. Both the U.S. and Russia do not trust 
each other, in fact, officials in the Russian Defense 
Ministry have admitted that the Obama 
Administration’s pursuit of a world free of nuclear 
weapons is really an attempt to dominate with 
conventional weapons (Shuster). The five 
superpowers are working to maintain what is left 
of their stockpiles because they are certain that 
others are doing the same.  
The second reason for the superpowers slowed 
dismantlement and simultaneous modernization is 
that the NPT does not discuss modernization. 
Although Article VI of the treaty requires the U.S., 
the U.K., Russia, France, and China to work 
towards the dismantlement of stockpiles and 
“pursue negotiations in good faith” at an “early 
date,” there are no limitations in terms of 
modernizing weapons (Treaty 1968) (Kristensen 
2014 106-107). In the 2015 review conference, 
many non-nuclear state parties pointed to the 
nuclear state’s expensive and counterproductive 
modernization programs, nuclear policies, and 
slow disarmament pace, as evidence for concerns 
of serious penalties (Arms Control Experts). 
However, the vagueness of the NPT, as well as, the 
persistence of nuclear parties to follow through 
with such programs, has led to disputes and an 
inability to update a plan for action (Arms Control 
Experts).  
The NPT originally functioned as a means to 
de-escalate tensions caused by the Cold War. 
These countries were fearful of the mutually 
assured destruction that would come from a 
nuclear war. The NPT was a way for these powers 
to reduce their stockpiles with assurance that other 
nuclear-armed countries were doing the same. 
However, now the intention to maintain nuclear 
stockpiles, regardless of NPT obligations, has 
resulted in its preservation by all five-weapon 
states. As Waltz describes, countries will acquire 
nuclear weapons in retaliation of other countries 
that have acquired them, as evidenced by Russia 
and the U.S. (Waltz). Countries will also equip 
themselves out of fear of uncertainty and, refusing 
to rely on other states like Britain, China, and 
France, for protection.   
 
CASE STUDIES: NON-NUCLEAR - 
WEAPON STATE PARTIES 
Party states that signed the NPT and have not 
manufactured or exploded a nuclear weapon 
device prior to January 1, 1967 are called non-
nuclear weapon state parties. There are over 180 
non-nuclear weapon state parties, all of which are 
located in various regions around the world 
(Treaty). In accordance with the NPT, these 
parties cannot receive or have control over nuclear 
weapons and similar explosive devices (Treaty 
1968). These states cannot seek or receive 
assistance to produce weapons. In addition, each 
non-nuclear weapon state party is to accept the 
safeguards negotiated with the IAEA, in order to 
remain in compliance with the NPT’s 
requirements, and to remain within the bounds of 
peaceful nuclear activity (Treaty 1968). However, 
many non-nuclear state parties are capable of 
acquiring nuclear weapons. For example, Brazil 
and Japan have the technological and economic 
resources to do so; however, they have chosen not 
to acquire these weapons. Whether this is a result 
of obligations imposed on them by the NPT, is 
worth consideration.  
 Brazil’s nuclear program first began in the 
1930’s (Brazil’s Nuclear). Motivated by the military 
regimes that dominated Brazil between 1964 and 
1985, the programs primarily focused on uranium 
enrichment (Brazil’s Nuclear). Eventually every 
branch of Brazil’s military had their own nuclear 
weapons program (Marvin). Their pursuit of 
nuclear weapons was due to a longstanding rivalry 
between Brazil and Argentina (Brazil’s Nuclear). 
Their ambitions toward regional influence and 
recognition within the international community is 
what ignited the contention. In 1967, Brazil signed 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco making Latin America a 
nuclear free zone. However, limitations in nuclear 
activity were not set forth until 1988 when Brazil 
approved a new constitution restricting their use 
of nuclear activities to peaceful purposes only. 
Overtime, the competition between both Brazil 
and Argentina diminished because of 
democratization. Eventually, the two states signed 
an agreement pledging to maintain peaceful 
nuclear activities.  In 1998, Brazil became a party 
of the NPT; however, the country’s participation 
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in the treaty occurred much later due to hesitation 
from Brazil’s leaders. They believed the NPT was a 
means for foreign forces to control and hinder 
Brazil’s nuclear objectives. Leaders like President 
Lula Da Silva believed signing the treaty would be 
detrimental, especially considering the possibility 
of conflict between Brazil and a nuclear power 
(Brazil’s Nuclear).  
 Since their signing of the NPT, Brazil’s nuclear 
weapons programs has ended. Their current goal 
is to reach self-sufficiency in selling nuclear fuel to 
the international market (Brazil’s Nuclear). Today, 
Brazil has the most advanced nuclear facilities in 
Latin America, and works to uphold nuclear 
weapon states to their nuclear disarmament 
obligations set forth by the NPT (Country 
Profiles). Although Brazil appears to have shifted 
from critic to advocate of the NPT, the real 
motivator behind Brazil’s refusal to acquire 
nuclear weapons is that it does not have a reason 
to. Unlike nuclear weapon states, such as the U.S. 
and Russia, or nuclear non-party states, such as 
Pakistan and India, Brazil does not face a serious 
security dilemma (Marvin). Brazil’s push for 
nuclear weapons in the 1930’s was a result of the 
tense relations and rivalry with Argentina. Brazil 
along with Argentina and Chile have already had 
their own nuclear arms race. However, similar to 
the allies and Russia, the fear of mutually assured 
destruction pushed them towards disarmament. 
The democratization of the countries helped to 
diffuse the tension between Brazil and Argentina, 
as well as, the Treaty of Tlateloco provided an 
“out” that was preferable to the NPT at the time 
(Marvin). Today, Brazil does not face serious 
threats to its security. Regardless of its ability to 
obtain nuclear weaponry, it is the low security 
threat that inclines Brazil to avoid arming itself 
and not the NPT.  
 Another non-nuclear weapon state with the 
intelligence and financial resources to possess 
nuclear weapons is Japan. Japan’s non-nuclear 
policy stance derives from its devastating history 
in the Cold War, specifically the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki bombings (Japan). The country has 
never developed a complete nuclear weapons 
program; rather, it has implemented anti-nuclear 
weapons policies. These policies restrict Japan’s 
use of nuclear activity to peaceful purposes, and 
forbids the manufacturing, possession, or 
transportation of nuclear weapons in Japan. The 
country became an official signatory of the NPT in 
1968. Similar to Brazil, Japanese leaders had their 
reservations towards the NPT. Leaders were deeply 
concerned that it would hinder the country from 
achieving national energy needs through nuclear 
technology. Others worried it would be 
detrimental to Japan’s security in the future 
(Japan).  
 Since its signing, Japan has remained a leader 
in the fight towards a nuclear-free world. In fact, 
the country has reached out to non-nuclear 
weapon states like Canada, Mexico, the United 
Arab Emirates, and Poland, to advance nuclear 
disarmament and nonproliferation efforts (Japan). 
Even the country’s public, shares serious anti-
nuclear weapons attitudes. Nevertheless, the 
country has undergone recent nuclearization 
debates primarily fueled by the tensions in the 
Korean peninsula (Japan). In October 2006, North 
Korea conducted a nuclear weapons test, which 
caused many of Japan’s top officials to question 
the idea of a Japanese nuclear arsenal (Hughes). 
Officials argued that Japan is constitutionally 
entitled to possess nuclear weapons for the 
exclusive purpose of self-defense (Hughes). 
Nonetheless, many scholars argue that Japan is too 
invested in its commitment to nonproliferation to 
begin developing nuclear weapons (Japan).  
 Whether or not the NPT will continue to hold 
Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons is 
debatable. Although Japan is consistent in its anti-
nuclear weapons stance, one can argue that this 
stance is the result of Japan’s low-level security 
threats, and were it to have a threat to security, 
may alter this stance. Over the years, the Japanese 
government has maintained a relaxed response to 
events many would find concerning like China’s 
nuclear test in 1964, the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War, and North Korea’s nuclear efforts today 
(Hughes). Japan is able to maintain this 
composure, especially with North Korea, because 
it does not find the security threat to be high. The 
Japanese government believes that North Korea 
would require more time, beyond their first test, to 
develop the nuclear weapons they desired. This 
leaves more time for the Japanese to pursue 
diplomatic negotiations. Secondly, the Japan’s 
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initial response to North Korean nuclear threats 
would be an acceleration in their ballistic defense 
systems (Hughes). Further, Japan’s reliance on the 
U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is also a major 
reason for their relaxed approach (Japan). Their 
reliance began in 2013 when Japan created a 
national security strategy against North Korea. 
This strategy primarily consists of Japan’s ballistic 
missile defense and increased cooperation in 
extended deterrence with the U.S. This 
commitment has ensured Japan’s security making 
it easier for Japan to worry less about nuclear 
threats, and more on nonproliferation (Japan).  
 In addition, the security risks from Japan’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons will far outweigh the 
benefits. While Japan may be able to protect itself 
by working towards nuclear capabilities, their 
possession of nuclear weapons can potentially 
cause an arms race between Japan, China, and 
North Korea (Hughes). This security dilemma is 
not in the interest of the Japanese or the U.S., and 
any potential for the U.S. to not provide deterrence 
after Japan’s nuclear weapon possession, would be 
detrimental to Japan’s security. Although Japan is 
among those on the forefront of progressive 
nonproliferation efforts as outlined by the NPT, its 
decision to abide by it is ultimately a result of its 
lack of national security threats. If the threat posed 
by North Korea reached a state of serious concern 
to Japan, it will welcome U.S. nuclear arms into 
the country as it did in Okinawa in 1969 (Japan).  
 
CASE STUDIES: NUCLEAR NON-PARTY 
STATES 
Nuclear non-party states are those that have not 
signed the NPT and pursue nuclear weapons. 
These countries are comprised of Israel, India, and 
Pakistan. North Korea also falls in this category, as 
it was originally a signer; however, it has since 
opted to possess nuclear weapons, therefore 
violating the treaty. Each of these countries began 
their nuclear weapons programs within a decade 
of each other. Israel is the first country in the 
Middle East to possess nuclear weapons (Israel 
Nuclear). Beginning its pursuit in the 1950s, Israel 
sought nuclear weaponry as a means to ease the 
threat posed by its neighbors. In addition, the 
U.S.’s “abandonment” of Israel during the Suez 
Canal, solidified Israel’s pursuit of a self-sustained 
nuclear deterrence. Maintaining a sense of secrecy, 
there it is unknown the exact size of Israel’s 
nuclear weapons. Experts agree that the weapons 
do exist; however, specifics on the country’s 
biological and chemical weapons programs are 
unknown. Although Israel is not a signer of the 
NPT, the country maintains that it is interested in 
a nuclear-free Middle East, with the caveat that 
comprehensive peace is essential before such talks 
can occur (Israel Nuclear).  
India’s exploration of nuclear weapons began 
in the 1940s with an actual program developed in 
the 1960s (India). From 1997 to 2009, the country 
also had a chemical weapons program. After 
completing five tests in 1998, the country declared 
itself a nuclear weapon state. In 2005, the U.S. 
collaborated with India allowing them into the 
international nuclear market as long as they 
abided by specific safeguards. As of 2015, India’s 
nuclear arsenal consisted of 90 to 110 warheads. 
India remains a non-signer of the NPT for 
multiple reasons. For one, India’s leaders believe 
the NPT maintains an unfair distinction between 
the nuclear weapon states and the rest of the 
world. The treaty allows these states to possess 
nuclear weapons while enforcing strict restrictions 
on non-nuclear states. In addition, India is highly 
critical of the nuclear-weapon state’s disarmament 
efforts. Since the NPT’s inception, the nuclear 
weapon states have yet to achieve the obligations 
set forth in Article IV of the treaty (India).  
Pakistan began its nuclear weapons programs 
in the 1970s following the Indo-Pakistani War 
(Pakistan). Such efforts were motivated by 
Pakistan’s desire to curb the conventional 
inferiority against India. Following India’s tests, 
Pakistan began its own trials specifically focusing 
on uranium enrichment. Eventually, the country 
declared itself a nuclear weapon state. Since then, 
Pakistan refuses to sign the NPT in addition to a 
majority of other anti-nuclear arms treaties 
(Pakistan).  
North Korea has pushed for its own nuclear 
weapons program since the end of WWII (North 
Korea). Advancements toward nuclear weaponry 
increased after North Korea announced its 
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The country 
justified this move by citing U.S. aggressions and 
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the Bush administration’s pre-emption doctrine, 
as declarations of war (Pollack). Efforts by the 
international community to reduce North Korea’s 
stockpile have been unsuccessful. In 2013, North 
Korea along with South Korea, Japan, China, 
Russia, and the U.S. held talks aimed to 
denuclearize the Korean peninsula (North Korea). 
However, after disputes with the U.S. over a North 
Korean rocket launch, the government voided the 
discussion and proceeded to conduct nuclear tests. 
Today, the country has an active nuclear weapons 
program, and it is believed to possess both a 
biological and chemical weapons program. State 
media has also announced that all nuclear facilities 
were functioning to improve the country’s nuclear 
stockpile.  
Israel, India, and Pakistan, and North Korea’s 
nuclear history is a prime example of how external 
threats incline countries to adopt nuclear 
weaponry. The regional tensions and differences in 
military strength pose a serious security issue. 
These states refuse to rely on nuclear weapon 
states for protection. Nuclear nonparty states do 
not trust the NPT because they do not see all state 
actors in compliance with disarmament. These 
countries cannot be sure that nuclear weapon 
states will protect them, nor that they will comply 
with the disarmament efforts. Therefore, these 
countries would rather equip themselves with 
nuclear arms and stabilize their security, as 
opposed to being party to a treaty that infringes on 
their right to protection.  
 
ANALYSIS 
After analyzing nuclear party, non-nuclear party, 
and nuclear non-party states, it is clear that the 
NPT influences each differently. Initially, the NPT 
was a way for states to address heightened tensions 
by disarming their nuclear stockpiles. Since then, 
the NPT has led to significant reductions in the 
world’s nuclear inventory, as well as, a joint effort 
from nations across the globe to refrain from 
nuclear use. However, overtime the NPT’s power 
over states has diminished. 
Nuclear weapon states like Russia have 
ignored the NPT and openly admitted to 
preserving stockpiles, while simultaneously 
supporting their country’s modernization 
programs. Super powers like France and Great 
Britain have emphasized their right to use nuclear 
force in the case of an invasion, attack, or 
aggression, leaving opportunity for nuclear use 
against others in the international community. 
Again, this contradicts the NPT’s function within 
the global system. Nonetheless, the nuclear powers 
continue to pursue these loopholes, which 
essentially undoes the progress made since the 
Cold War.  
The NPT’s influence on non-nuclear weapon 
states is also diminishing. The reality is non-
nuclear weapon states are only abiding by the 
treaty because they are not facing a current 
security threat. States like Brazil and Japan do not 
have tense relations like that of the U.S. and 
Russia, making their pursuit of nuclear weapons 
rather pointless. In addition, some non-nuclear 
weapon states like Japan have ensured nuclear 
protection from the U.S. in the case of future 
security threats. This has also kept them from 
addressing a nuclear option. They are abiding by 
the NPT because they have ensured their nuclear 
protection by other means, i.e countries who 
already possess nuclear weaponry.   
Nuclear non-party states are continuing their 
weapons programs with little consideration of the 
NPT. Israel, Pakistan, India, and now North Korea 
continue to explore nuclear capabilities in the 
name of national security. These countries have 
expressed opposition to the NPT believing that its 
sole function is to restrict their ability to protect 
themselves. India and other non-nuclear party 
states have criticized the NPT for not holding 
nuclear weapon states accountable to their 
obligations under the provision of the NPT. 
Overall, the NPT’s influence is not pertinent to a 
non-party states decision to pursue nuclear 
weapons.  
 There are multiple reasons for why states 
increase their stockpiles. However, the driving 
force in their decision-making process is national 
security. States will ultimately decide on whether 
or not to pursue nuclear weapons, based on if they 
currently face a security threat. Countries that 
undergo their own “cold war tensions” will arm 
themselves with nuclear weapons as an attempt to 
even the playing field and secure their countries 
safety. As evidenced by the efforts of states like 
Israel, India, and Pakistan.  
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Countries that have not acquired a nuclear 
stockpile, like Brazil and Japan, do so because their 
current state of security does not dictate the need 
for nuclear weaponry. Brazil armed itself with 
nuclear weapons after its “cold war tensions” with 
Argentina. The two participated in their own arms 
race, which made securing a stockpile critical. 
However, since their signing of the Treaty of 
Tlateloco and the NPT, tensions between Brazil 
and Argentina have decreased significantly. The 
country no longer faces a security threat and no 
longer feels the need to arm itself with nuclear 
weapons. 
However, that is not to say that Brazil or other 
non-nuclear weapon states will never consider 
nuclear weapons. If there is a national security 
threat, these states will consider a nuclear option, 
just as other’s have done in the past. This reality is 
present with Japan. Though the country has had a 
devastating experience with nuclear weapons, and 
has remained at the forefront of nonproliferation 
efforts, Japan still ensures its security from North 
Korea by relying on the U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence. The lack of security threats along with 
this safety guarantee by the U.S. are the only 
reasons why Japan will not pursue a nuclear 
program today.  
Similar to nuclear weapon non-party states 
and non-nuclear weapon party states, countries 
like the U.S., the U.K., France, Russia, and China 
refuse to disarm because of their national security. 
Initially, the NPT functioned as a means to lessen 
tensions during the Cold War and push for the 
elimination of the world’s nuclear stockpile. 
However, today tense relations have resurfaced. 
The U.S.-Russia relationship has declined 
tremendously. For Russia to compete with the 
U.S.’s conventional weapons, it must maintain 
whatever is left of its nuclear arsenal. Curbing this 
gap helps secure Russia’s security against the U.S. 
Since Russia has openly admitted to preserving its 
remaining stockpile, other nations – the U.S., the 
U.K., France, and China – will follow suit. The 
U.S. will maintain and modernize its nuclear 
weapons because of the threat Russia poses to U.S. 
security. The U.K., France, and China will do the 
same to avoid relying on the U.S. and Russia for 
protection. These nations have placed their 
security before fulfilling their NPT obligations, 
and in doing so have undone the majority of the 
NPT’s progress since the Cold War. Now the 
world faces the reality of having a smaller amount 
of nuclear weapons that can cause larger amounts 
of damage.   
 Whether the NPT can prevent countries from 
pursuing these nuclear weapons, especially when 
external threats incline them to do so, is debatable. 
However, the research implies that it is not likely. 
Regardless of which countries are in dispute, as 
long as that nation’s security is threatened, nuclear 
weapons will remain an option. Countries will not 
withhold themselves from nuclear weapons if the 
rest of the international community is working 
towards them. As long as countries feel threatened, 
nuclear weapons will remain a legitimate option 
for stability, which surpasses their obligations or 
commitments to the NPT. Countries like Pakistan, 
India, and North Korea will ignore the 
international community’s call for a nuclear-free 
world to ensure they are protected from the 
regional threats they face. States like Japan will 
comply with the NPT as long as they are promised 
nuclear security by other states like the U.S., 
otherwise they may explore a nuclear option. 
Lastly, countries like the U.S. and Russia will 
continue to maintain and modernize existing 
stockpiles out of fear of security and argue that 
modernization does not outright violate the NPT. 
This ultimately leads one to question whether 
a world free of nuclear arms is achievable under 
the NPT. Although the international community 
had intentions to reduce and completely dissolve 
the world of nuclear weapons, it is apparent now 
that the treaty no longer has the same power on 
states. The NPT does not provide effective 
solutions for the reasons why countries pursue and 
preserve nuclear arms in the first place. At the time 
of its creation, writers of the NPT did not foresee 
modernization as an option for states. The goal 
was to reduce U.S.-Soviet Union tensions and 
push for total elimination of nuclear weapons. 
Since the NPT does not address modernization, 
states can continue to do so while arguing that it 
does not violate the NPT. In addition, the NPT 
lacks specificity in its obligations. The NPT 
requires nuclear weapon states to disarm at an 
“early date,” giving these countries room to argue 
for as much time as they please. These major issues 
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within the treaty have fueled disputes among the 
international community. Many non-nuclear party 
states are growing frustrated with the lack of 
commitment exhibited by nuclear party states. 
Instead of dismantling stockpiles further, these 
states are advancing their weaponry, which will 
only ignite tensions among other states. The rising 
tensions will ultimately lead to more countries 
pursuing nuclear weapons programs and decrease 
the number of countries willing to follow the 
guidelines and goals of the NPT. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The reality of the NPT and its influence on the 
international community remains consistent with 
the realist perspective. The realist perspective on 
the NPT relies on the fact that states will always 
prioritize their security, since doing so reflects the 
rational behavior of states. Nuclear weapon states 
have not only admitted to preserving their existing 
stockpiles, but also to making them more 
dangerous. This is all in the name of security, 
which is what realist theory highlights. Realists 
also argue that states will never completely disarm 
because doing so is irrational. This is evident in the 
nuclear weapons states inability to disarm further 
than they already have. These states want to 
maintain some level of competitive warfare to 
ensure their existence against rivaling states.  
Realist perspective argues that the NPT has 
created a hierarchical system where some states 
have permission to explore their nuclear 
capabilities, while restricting access to this 
technology for others. States have contended the 
imbalance in regulating nuclear weapon states. 
Nuclear weapon states are able to continue such 
programs whilst the international community 
debates over the legitimacy of such actions under 
the NPT. Regardless of the obvious contradiction 
in the actions of nuclear weapon states and the 
NPT, the U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China 
continue to preserve and modernize stockpiles.  
The Liberal perspective argues that the NPT 
will work because countries are looking to avoid 
nuclear war. They contend that avoiding nuclear 
war falls in line with maintaining national security 
and therefore is in their best interest. While the 
Constructivists argue that, the NPT’s influence 
ultimately depends on how state actors give 
meaning to it. However, these approaches requires 
all states to comply with the obligations set forth in 
the NPT. Otherwise if one state opts for a nuclear 
program, other countries, especially those that find 
the nuclear state a threat, will push for their own 
program. 
Today, the international community is 
composed of states all interested in maintaining 
self-existence. States have neglected their 
responsibilities to the NPT for the sake of 
maintaining national security. States that do 
comply with the NPT, only do so because they do 
not yet have a national security threat, which 
would result in their needing to invest in nuclear 
warfare. However, given certain circumstances 
these countries are not compelled by the NPT to 
consider non-nuclear options. This security-driven 
focus aligns with the realist theory, further 
illustrating this school of thought as the most 
accurate in addressing the function and 
effectiveness of the NPT on the international 
community.  
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